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Other People's Money: The Ethics
of Litigation Funding
by Douglas R. Richmond"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Litigation can be expensive, sometimes incredibly expensive. There
are investigators to employ, expert witnesses to compensate, court
reporters to pay, documents to photocopy or electronically image, travel
expenses, demonstrative evidence to create, and so on. An attorney's
time itself is valuable. A party's time is also valuable, and plaintiffs
who are disabled as a result of injuries they have sustained may need
money to live on.' As a result, a wealthy litigant, who can outspend a
poorer litigant, is generally at an advantage and may be able to obtain
a favorable settlement through attrition.2
This litigation reality is perceived to be a problem by some commentators because justice ought not follow wealth.3 The equalizer in the civil
justice system, of course, is the contingent fee method of attorney
compensation. While contingent fees address attorney compensation
issues, they do not aid a plaintiff's attorney when it comes to funding

Senior Vice President, Professional Services Group, Aon Risk Services, Chicago,
Illinois. University of Kansas (J.D., 1989); University of Nebraska (M.Ed., 1981); Fort
Hays State University (B.S., 1980). Views expressed in this Article are the Author's alone
and are not necessarily shared by any Aon entity or client.
1. See In re K.A.H., 967 P.2d 91, 93 (Alaska 1998) (observing that plaintiffs in personal
injury cases may be "unable to survive prolonged litigation without financial assistance").
2. See id. at 93 (noting somewhat caustically that defendants who are "aware of the
economic pressure burdening unaided plaintiffs have every incentive to prolong the
litigation with frivolous motions and discovery").
3. See Susan Lorde Martin, FinancingLitigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles,
1 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 85, 85 (2002) (observing that "the idea that 'wealth [should not
have] the monopoly of justice against poverty' has been embraced as a basic principle in
the legal system of the United States") (quoting eighteenth century scholar) (footnote
omitted).
*
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litigation expenses, nor do they help a plaintiff with the costs of daily
living.4 Litigation funding companies fill this void.5 Litigation funding
companies may loan money to plaintiffs for living expenses or to
attorneys to fund case expenses.6 For example, a litigation funding
company may agree to loan a plaintiff $10,000 in exchange for the first
$25,000 of any settlement or judgment received within a specified time.
Alternatively, a litigation funding company might advance money for
expenses to an attorney. Upon recovery the attorney will repay the
amount funded plus a fee equal to one dollar for every dollar of funding
provided. Thus, a litigation funding company that advances $50,000 to
a successful attorney will recoup its investment plus a $50,000 fee. All
such loans or advances, whether to plaintiffs or attorneys, are nonrecourse. The litigation funding company's recovery is limited to any
settlement or judgment obtained, and the company may not seek
repayment from the plaintiff's or attorney's other assets.'
Litigation funding has emerged as a new financial services industry.
Litigation funding companies are best thought of as specialized investors
or lenders for several reasons.
First, with respect to plaintiffs, most traditional lenders are unwilling
to lend money with only a potential litigation recovery as collateral
because such loans are deemed to be too risky.8 There is no way to
value a plaintiff's claim or lawsuit in the same way that a business can
be valued. Additionally, loan officers are usually incapable of assessing

4. See James E. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition,Thin Rationale: The "Acquisitionof an
Interest and FinancialAssistance in Litigation"Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 223, 223
(2003) ("Black letter lawyer ethics law prohibits lawyers... from providing most forms of
financial assistance to litigation clients.") (footnote omitted).
5. Martin, supra note 3, at 85.
6. See, e.g., FundingSolutions for Plaintiffs and TheirAttorneys, Oasis Legal Finance,
available at http://www.oasislegal.com (last visited June 25, 2004) (offering funding for
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys); ProgramDescription,Capital Transaction Group, Inc.,
available at http://www.captran.com (last visited June 21, 2004) (explaining briefly,
litigation funding programs for litigants and for attorneys).
7. See, e.g., FAQs, Legal Advances, availableat http://www.legaladvances.comllawsuitfunding-faq.htm (last visited June 25, 2004) (stating that funding is nonrecourse); Attorney
Funding, Accident-Lawsuit-Financing.com, available at http://accident-lawsuit-financing.com/attorneyjfunding.htm (last visited June 21, 2004) ("If you do not win the case, the
Funds do not have to be repaid!"); Frequently Asked Questions, Case Funding Network,
L.P., available at http://casefunding.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2004) ("If the case is
ultimately lost, CFN loses as well and you ... owe CFN nothing."); Frequently Asked
Questions, Capital Transaction Group, Inc., available at http://www.captran.comlfaq.asp
(last visited June 21, 2004) (explaining nonrecourse nature of litigation funding
arrangement).
8. Martin, supra note 3, at 85.
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the value of a claim or suit. Such evaluations are the domain of
experienced trial lawyers and insurance claim adjusters.
Second, regarding financing plaintiffs' attorneys, although some
traditional lenders are willing to do so,' many are unwilling to provide
funding because of associated economic or financial risks and uncertainties. Additiqnally, the lender may have no means of valuing a particular
attorney's varied cases. Unlike attorneys who derive the majority of
their income from hourly billing or flat fees, plaintiffs' attorneys
dependent upon contingent fees have no accounts receivable, and
therefore cannot tap into many lending resources.' ° In the same vein,
it is difficult for a lender to be properly secured when lending to lawyers
who derive their income from contingent fees because security interests
in their anticipated recoveries are not easily enforceable. Banks that are
willing to extend credit to plaintiffs' attorneys often have burdensome
application, documentation, reporting, and oversight requirements.
Third, the potential profits for a litigation funding company are
handsome. The key to success for funding companies is to employ people
with the claim and case evaluation expertise that traditional lenders
typically lack or to develop systems or methodologies that are reasonable
substitutes for such expertise.
The emergence of litigation funding as a new financial services
industry has been marked by judicial distrust. 1 The practice evokes
concerns about champerty and maintenance, legal doctrines seldom seen
in recent years.' 2 Critics of the practice are concerned that litigation
financiers will potentially manipulate the parties to whom they make
loans 3 or will act in ways that impair the professional judgment of the

9. Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1330 (2002) ("Currently, many small plaintiffs' firms finance their
operations through bank loans.").
10. See generally Mike France, The Litigation Machine, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 29,
2001, at http://businessweek.com/2001/01_05/b3717001.htm
("Plaintiffs' attorneys invest all their time and money in a case up front and then
may have to wait years for a payoff. It can be a scary, boom-bust, oil-wildcatter
kind of business. Lawyers usually drill a lot of dry holes and try to tide
themselves over with a few gushers.").
11. See Gary Young, Two Setbacks for Lawsuit FinancingBut The PracticeIs Still Alive
And Well, NAT'L L.J., July 28, 2003, at Al (stating that "[t]he business of litigation finance
is battered but upright after taking a beating in two courtrooms in the last year," and
reporting on decisions in Ohio and North Carolina).
12. See, e.g., Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217,219 (Ohio
2003) (holding that litigation funding transactions constituted champerty and maintenance,
and were, therefore, void and unenforceable).
13. See id. at 221.
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attorneys to whom they advance expenses.' 4 Lawyers who may need
to finance litigation through a litigation funding company, or who must
counsel a client who wants to borrow against an anticipated settlement
or judgment, must therefore, consider the professional responsibility
ramifications of their decisions or advice.
This Article advocates the position that litigation funding as it is
commonly employed is ethical. Litigation funding companies do not, by
their ordinary practices, create serious professional responsibility
problems for attorneys. Any potential professional responsibility traps
that litigation funding creates can be easily avoided by carefully drafting
the funding agreement.
Looking ahead, Section II discusses the doctrines of champerty,
maintenance, barratry, and usury in connection with litigation funding.
These doctrines bear on lawyers' professional responsibility because both
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 5 and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility 16 provide that it is professional misconduct
for lawyers to engage in conduct that is "prejudicial to the administration of justice," v and engaging in unlawful conduct is just such an
example of professional misconduct. Additionally, the application of
these doctrines may implicate attorneys' duties of competence, communication, and confidentiality. Section III discusses ethics rules that
arguably might apply in the litigation funding context, unrelated to
concerns about the legal doctrines discussed in Section II. Again, the
conclusion is always the same: with respect to lawyers, litigation funding
is ethical.
II.

CHAMPERTY, MAINTENANCE, BARRATRY, AND USURY

Champerty, Maintenance, and Barratry
The doctrines of "champerty," "maintenance," and "barratry" originated
in medieval England when claims and rights were not freely assignable.'" At common law, champerty refers to an agreement by which
someone having no interest in the subject of an action "undertakes to

A.

14. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "permit a person who ... pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional
judgment in rendering such legal services." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(c)
(2004).
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
16. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
17. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 8.4(d); MODEL CODE, supra note 16, at DR 1102(A)(5).
18. Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000).
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carry on the suit at his own expense, or to aid in so doing, in consideration of receiving, in the event of success, some part of the land,
property, or money recovered or deriving some benefit therefrom. ''19 A
person who engages in champerty is called a "champertor," and an
agreement amounting to champerty is described as "champertous."
Champerty is a form of maintenance, which is defined as "officious
intermeddling in a suit that in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or
assisting either party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend
it."2" Barratry is "the crime or offense of frequently stirring up suits
Simply summarized, "mainteand quarrels between individuals."2
nance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a
suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a
continuing practice of maintenance or champerty."22
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance qualify as obscure, and
barratry is seldom seen. 3 Several jurisdictions have done away with
the doctrines entirely,24 reasoning that "other well-developed principles
of law can more effectively accomplish the goals of preventing speculation in groundless lawsuits and the filing of frivolous suits" than can
these dated doctrines.2" Where recognized, champerty and maintenance typically serve as contract defenses.2" Offending contracts are
void and unenforceable.2 7
The fact that a litigant can void a champertous contract is usually of
no consequence to its adversary because the doctrines of champerty and
maintenance do not bear on the litigant's right to prosecute the
associated action. 8 Furthermore, a defendant who is being sued by a
plaintiff whose lawsuit is financed by a third-party lacks standing to

19. 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 2.a (1991) (footnote omitted).
20. Id. at § 2.b.
21. Id. at § 2.c.
22. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978).
23. But see Citibank v. Hauff, 668 N.W.2d 528, 537 (S.D. 2003) (discussing South
Dakota statutory action for civil barratry).
24. See, e.g., Landi v. Arkules, 835 P.2d 458, 464 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Saladini v.
Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226-27 (Mass. 1997); Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532
S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000).
25. Osprey, Inc., 532 S.E.2d at 277.
26. See, e.g., Sneed v. Ford Motor Co., 735 So. 2d 306, 314-15 (Miss. 1999); Rancman
v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 219-21 (Ohio 2003); McKellips v.
Mackintosh, 475 N.W.2d 926, 929 (S.D. 1991).
27. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 455 S.E.2d 655, 657
(N.C. 1995); Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221; McKellips, 475 N.W.2d at 929.
28. See Sneed, 735 So. 2d at 315 ("If we had determined the agreement ... to be
But that would not have had
champertous, then it would have been a void contract ....
any bearing on the rights of the Plaintiffs to continue the prosecution of their action.").
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Accordingly, a defendant
challenge the associated agreement.2 9
agreement in the name
funding
a
litigation
generally cannot seek to void
defeat the plaintiff's
way
of champerty or maintenance and in this
3
who is sued by a
a
defendant
suit. " In a few jurisdictions, however,
that the
by
asserting
advantage
some
derive
champertous plaintiff can
that the
such
in
interest,
party
a
real
is
not
or
standing
lacks
plaintiff
Whatever the defensive effects of
action should be dismissed.3'
champerty and maintenance, the doctrines are rarely viable offensive
weapons.3 2 They are generally not actionable as torts.
Three final points bear mentioning. First, if an agreement is
champertous, it necessarily constitutes maintenance because champerty
is a form of maintenance.3 4 The terms champerty and maintenance are
essentially interchangeable.33 Second, courts are reluctant to deem
agreements champertous or to conclude that they constitute maintenance. 36 Third, although champerty was originally prohibited, at least
in part, to "prevent attorneys from stirring up litigation or from
becoming involved in a lawsuit solely for personal economic benefit,"3 7

29. Killian v. Millard, 279 Cal. Rptr. 877, 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
30. See id. at 879-80.
31. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 655 A.2d 827, 829-31 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994) (discussing
plaintiffs lack of standing as a defense); Clark v. Cambria County Bd. of Assessment
Appeals, 747 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (discussing "real party in interest"
and standing).
32. But see Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., 798 A.2d 901, 906 (R.I. 2002)
(explaining that "maintenance remains a recognized cause of action in Rhode Island").
33. See, e.g., Tosi v. Jones, 685 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that
Ohio has never recognized champerty and maintenance as common law torts).
34. See Sneed, 735 So. 2d at 309 (quoting State ex rel. Carr v. Cabana Terrace, Inc., 153
So. 2d 257, 259 (Miss. 1963) (explaining that champerty "is a species of maintenance" and
that courts use the terms "champerty" and "maintenance" almost interchangeably)).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Reichhart v. City of New Haven, 674 N.E.2d 27, 32 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997) (rejecting champerty and maintenance arguments because of alleged champertor's
interest in the subject of the litigation); Sneed, 735 So. 2d at 314-15 (rejecting defendant's
argument because plaintiffs did not bring action because of inducement by or assistance
from alleged champertors); Schnabel v. Taft Broad. Co., 525 S.W.2d 819, 823-25 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1975); Schwartz v. Eliades, 939 P.2d 1034, 1036-38 (Nev. 1997) (determining that
agreement was not champertous because the alleged champertor had an interest in the
subject of the action); Reinhardt v. Kelly, 917 P.2d 963, 967 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that plaintiffs agreement with a co-plaintiff was not champertous because the plaintiff had
an interest in the lawsuit); Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, 731 N.E.2d 581, 58687 (N.Y. 2000); Beatley v. Schwartz, No. 03AP-911, 2004 WL 1244360, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 8, 2004) (rejecting champerty and maintenance arguments because tenants had
interest in guarantors' action).
37. Green v. Gremaux, 945 P.2d 903, 907 (Mont. 1997).
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attorney contingent fee agreements are generally not champertous.3"
The overarching principle, with respect to the last two points, is that
champerty and maintenance require the presence of "officious intermeddlers" or disinterested people dedicated to "stirring up strife." These
descriptions fit few alleged champertors and certainly do not fit most
attorneys working for contingent fees.39
1. Litigation Funding Meets Champerty and Maintenance in
Ohio. Litigation funding ran afoul of the champerty and maintenance
doctrines in 2003 when the Ohio Supreme Court decided Rancman v.
Interim Settlement Funding Corp.4 ° Roberta Rancman was injured in
an automobile accident. In March 1998 she sued State Farm Insurance
Company ("State Farm") for uninsured motorist benefits. Unwilling to
wait until her case was resolved to collect the insurance benefits,
Rancman contacted Interim Settlement Funding Corporation ("Interim")
about an advance of funds to be secured by her pending suit. In April
1999 Interim's president, on behalf of an affiliated company, Future
Settlement Funding ("FSF"), advanced $6000 to Rancman in exchange
for the first $16,800 she would recover if the case was resolved within
twelve months, $22,200 if the case was resolved within eighteen months,
or $27,600 if the case was resolved within twenty-four months.
Rancman had no obligation to repay the advance if her case was
unsuccessful. In September 1999 Interim advanced an additional $1000
to Rancman, secured by the next $2800 she expected to recover.

38. See 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 11.a (1991) (discussing champerty).
Attorneys contingent fee agreements typically are not champertous and do not constitute
maintenance because they obligate the client to pay litigation expenses. See Schnabel, 525
S.W.2d at 825 (explaining that attorney contingent fee agreements could not be considered
champertous because there was no allegation that the attorney "undertook to pay or protect
the client from payment of the costs and expenses of litigation, an essential element of
champerty properly pleaded").
39. See, e.g., Accrued Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir.
2002) (applying Maryland law and voiding syndication agreements that were "nothing more
than arrangements through which to intermeddle and stir up litigation for the purpose of
making a profit"); Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating
that "officious intermeddling is a necessary element of champerty"); Schnabel, 525 S.W.2d
at 823 (noting that "officious intermeddling" is an element of maintenance); Oliver v.
Bynum, 592 S.E.2d 707, 711 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Wright v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 305 S.E.2d 190, 192-93 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (concluding that attorney engaged in
champerty and maintenance because he acted for the purpose of "'stirring up strife and
continuing litigation'")); Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 444 (Okla. 1981)
(requiring proof of "officious intermeddling" for champerty); Osprey, Inc., 532 S.E.2d at 276
(noting that before abolishing champerty as a defense, a champertor is defined as "an
officious intermeddler who intend[s] to stir up strife" through a lawsuit).
40. 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003).
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advance, like the earlier FSF advance, was made nonreInterim's
41
course.

Rancman settled her suit against State Farm within twelve months for
$100,000. She subsequently refused to honor her contracts with either
FSF or Interim. Instead, she tendered the return of the sums advanced,
together with interest, at an annual rate of eight percent.42 In December 1999 Rancman sued to rescind her agreements with FSF and
Interim and sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that defendants'
were "unfair, deceptive and unconscionable sales practicagreements
43
es."
Rancman prevailed in magistrate court with the magistrate concluding
that the advances were loans that violated Ohio's usury laws and the
state's Small Loan Act.44 The trial court of common pleas adopted the
magistrate's findings and ordered that the advances be repaid as
Rancman had offered. The case then proceeded to the Ohio Court of
Appeals, which concluded that the advances were loans, and because
neither FSF nor Interim were licensed to make loans as required by the
Small Loan Act, their agreements with Rancman were void. The Ohio
Court of Appeals held that FSF and Interim had no right to recover any
principal, interest, or other charges on their loans, and reversed the
court of common pleas order requiring Rancman to repay the advances
Interim and FSF then appealed to the Ohio Supreme
plus interest.
45
Court.

Before the supreme court, Rancman argued that FSF's and Interim's
advances were impermissible loans because the companies incurred
virtually no risk 46 and because their potential profits exceeded Ohio's
legally permissible interest rate. FSF and Interim contended that their
advances were investments, not loans, and that the law does not limit
returns on investments. 47 The supreme court reasoned that it was
41.

Id. at 218-19.

42.
43.

Id.
Id.

44. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.01 to 1321.99 (West 2004).
45. Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 219.
46. At trial, Rancman introduced the testimony of Interim's president, Richard
Ashcroft, who also was an investor in FSF. He testified that Rancman's case was "low
risk" from a funding perspective because (1) her attorney was skilled in such cases; (2)
Ashcroft had full access to the case file; (3) Rancman was not liable for the accident; (4) her
car was seriously damaged in the accident; (5) Rancman suffered what he described as
"bright blood" injuries; and (6) Rancman had medical bills of $22,000, and he estimated the
value of personal injury cases as being between two and a half to six times the plaintiffs
medical bills. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001 WL
1339487, at **2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2001).
47. Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 219.
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unnecessary to determine the level of risk required to treat a contingent
advance as an investment as compared to a loan because the advances
at issue were "void as champerty and maintenance."48
The court in Rancman considered the advances to be champertous
because FSF and Interim sought to profit from Rancman's case. 49 The
advances constituted maintenance because FSF and Interim purchased
shares of a suit in which they did not have an independent interest and
because they gave Rancman a disincentive to settle her case.5" The
court explained Rancman's settlement disincentive as follows:
The $6,000 advance, for example, gave FSF the right to the first
$16,800 of the settlement after fees, expenses, and superior liens, if the
...case settled within 12 months. If there had not been any superior
liens ... and her attorney charged a 30-percent contingency fee,

Rancman would not have received any funds from a settlement of
$24,000 or less. This calculation gives Rancman an absolute disincentive to settle for $24,000 or less because she would keep the $6,000
advance regardless of whether she settles with State Farm and would
not receive any additional money from a $24,000 settlement.
Under the same facts, the $1,000 Interim advance would provide a
settlement disincentive of an additional $4,000. Thus, with no liens
and a 30-percent attorney fee, the $7,000 advanced to Rancman
effectively bars her from considering a settlement offer of up to
$28,000.
These advances also affect settlement offers greater than $28,000.
Suppose Rancman decides that she will settle for nothing less than
$80,000 minus attorney fees. Because of the obligation to repay the
advances, she would refuse to settle until State Farm offers $98,000.
If the settlement advance agreements are enforced, Rancman must
receive an $18,000 premium on a settlement offer to have the same
incentive to settle that she would have had if she had not entered into
the agreements with FSF and Interim.5
The court was equally troubled by the fact that champertors may earn
"a handsome profit by speculating in a lawsuit and by potentially
manipulating a party to the suit." 12 The FSF agreement recited
Rancman's acknowledgement that FSF "may, will, and should make a
substantial profit on this agreement." 3 The court thus declared that

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id. at 220-21 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 221.
Id.
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"a lawsuit is not an investment vehicle," and that "[a]n intermeddler is
not permitted to gorge upon the fruits of litigation." 4
The court in Rancman held that except "as otherwise permitted by
legislative enactment or the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
contract making the repayment of funds advanced to a party to a
pending case contingent upon the outcome of that case is void as
champerty and maintenance."" Accordingly, the contracts by which
FSF and Interim advanced funds to Rancman were void and unenforceable.56
Rancman is unpersuasive for six reasons. First, because FSF and
Interim presented the case to the supreme court calling for an interpretation of Ohio's Small Loan Act,57 and because champerty and maintenance did not form the basis of the lower courts' decisions, the parties
did not address the doctrines in their briefs.5 Once the supreme court
decided, however, that the application of those doctrines disposed of the
case, the court should have given FSF and Interim the opportunity, in
supplemental briefing, to explain why their funding agreements did not
constitute champerty or maintenance.5 9 Fairness would seem to compel
this approach. Moreover, inviting supplemental briefing surely would
have aided the supreme court in light of judges' acknowledged dependence on parties' legal arguments when deciding issues.6"
Second, the fact that the FSF and Interim advances gave Rancman no
incentive to settle her case for less than $28,000 forms no basis to void
the deals.6 ' Rancman may have had many reasons not to settle for less
than the $100,000 she ultimately received, the chief one being the true
value of her case if it was successfully litigated. Given Rancman's
documented medical expenses, Interim's president thought the case
might be worth $132,000.2

54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.

57. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.01 to 1321.99.
58. See Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221 (Christley, J., concurring).
59. See id. (Christley, J., concurring) (suggesting this approach).
60.

See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES,THE LAW OF LAWYERING

§ 29.11, at 29-16 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that "courts must rely on counsel to supply most of
the legal argument in litigated cases"); David R. Cohen, Writing Winning Briefs,
LITIGATION, Summer 2000, at 46, 48 ("Judges can rarely do as much work on the case as
the parties can. Judges must rely on the briefs.").
61. See Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 220-21 (explaining settlement disincentive).
62.

See Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at * 3 (explaining that Rancman had "hard meds"

of $22,000, and that according to Interim's president a personal injury case could be worth
as much as six times the "hard meds").
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Third, from a different perspective, what if Rancman was unable to
pursue the suit unless she had $7000 for living expenses? Absent the
advances, Rancman might have been under such financial pressure that
she would have accepted a settlement offer far below the true value of
her case.63 It is understandable that the court in Rancman would be
concerned about champertors being able to manipulate the parties with
whom they contract, 64 but the court should have also been conerned
about wealthy defendants or their liability insurers' ability to manipulate poor plaintiffs.65
Fourth, although FSF and Interim sought to profit from Rancman's
case, 66 the court's associated concern is senseless. Rancman's attorney
also sought to profit from her case, and based on a standard thirty-three
percent contingency fee, he stood to profit more than FSF and Interim.
Attorney contingent fee agreements are not champertous.6 v If the
court's concern was the amount of the funding companies' profit, its
concern was misplaced. Even if Rancman made a bad bargain, freedom
of contract allowed her to do so.66
The court also failed to consider the risk that litigation funding
companies face. For example, had Rancman been able to borrow $7000
from a bank, then lost her case at trial, she still would have had to
repay the bank at the interest rate to which she agreed. In contrast, she
would not be obligated to pay FSF and Interim because their advances
were nonrecourse. The determination of which arrangement is better for
a particular plaintiff, given the difference in repayment terms, depends
on the plaintiff, the case, the terms of the subject litigation funding
agreement, and any number of other facts. Although it is true that
Rancman's case was low risk from FSF's and Interim's perspectives, the
holding in Rancman is not limited to cases in which litigation financiers
face little risk. Of course, as a practical matter it would be impossible
to limit the holding in Rancman to low risk cases because (a) case

63. Inasmuch as FSF and Interim were "providers of funds of last resort," it seems
obvious that Rancman was unable to meet her financial needs by borrowing from a
traditional lender. See id. at *1.
64. See Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221 (expressing this concern).
65. As the North Carolina State Bar has observed, "a [plaintiffs] assignment of the
proceeds of a personal injury recovery to a lender ...may be the only way for an indigent
[plaintiff] to obtain the funds necessary for living expenses during the pendency of the...
lawsuit." N.C. State Bar, 2000 Formal Ethics Op. 4, at 1 (Jan. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.ncbar.com/eth-op (last visited Sept. 16, 2003).
66. Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 220.
67. 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 11.a (1991).
68. See Christeson v. Burba, 714 S.W.2d 183, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) ("The general
rule of freedom of contract includes the freedom to make a bad bargain.").
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characterization or categorization is an incredibly fact-specific, subjective
exercise; and (b) even cases reasonably described as low risk can still be
lost.
Fifth, in holding that speculating is prohibited in Ohio lawsuits, the
court in Rancman essentially branded FSF and Interim "intermeddlers."6 9 But the court's rationale for doing so is unclear. Rancman
approached the funding companies; they did not solicit her business.
The record was clear that FSF and Interim did not instigate the
litigation; Rancman contacted them after her suit had been on file for
approximately one month. There was no evidence that FSF or Interim
ever concerned themselves with the details of the litigation, or attempted
to impose their views about strategy or tactics on Rancman or her
lawyer.7v Consequently, it was unreasonable for the Ohio Supreme
Court to view FSF and Interim as meddling in Rancman's lawsuit, and
thus, void their agreements on the basis that the agreements constituted
champerty and maintenance.7 1
Finally, it is important to note that the holding in Rancman is limited
to litigation funding provided to parties.72 The case
does not impact a
73
litigation funding company's advances to lawyers.
2. Analyzing the Professional Responsibility Issues. Litigation
funding agreements like those in Rancman are not champertous.
Litigation funding companies that advance money to plaintiffs do not
instigate litigation, nor do they carry on suits at their own expense.
Two valid points can be made to refute courts' concerns that litigation
funding will fuel frivolous litigation.74 First, funding companies have

69. See Raneman, 789 N.E.2d at 221 ("Speculating in lawsuits is prohibited by Ohio
law. An intermeddler is not permitted to gorge upon the fruits of litigation.").
70. See id. at 218-19 (discussing underlying personal injury case and relationship
among Rancman, Interim, and FSF).
71. See Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that an
alleged champertor was not an officious intermeddler when: (1) she did not instigate
litigation but was instead approached by a litigant once his suit was on file; (2) she did not
concern herself with the litigation; (3) she did not impose her views on the attorneys or
litigants after loaning them money).
72. Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221 (stating that "a contract making the repayment of
funds advanced to a party to a pending case contingent upon the outcome of that case is
void as champerty and maintenance") (emphasis added).
73. See id. (discussing a contract involving "funds advanced to a party to a pending
case") (emphasis added).
74. The debate about the so-called "litigation explosion" and frivolous lawsuits is
beyond the scope of this Article. For a recent scholarly discussion of these issues, see
Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to Judgment:Are the "LitigationExplosion," "Liability
Crisis,"and Efficiency Cliches Eroding OurDay In Court and Jury Trial Commitments?,
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no incentive to advance money to plaintiffs whose lawsuits might reasonably be described as frivolous because the companies' chance of recovery
is low.75

Litigation funding companies exist to make money, not to

throw it away. Second, because the merits of a case exist independent
of a plaintiff's ability to afford litigation, prohibiting litigation funding
will in some instances discourage meritorious lawsuits.76
Similarly, some courts may fear that litigation funding offends public
policy because public policy favors settlements, 7 and litigation funding
is likely to prolong litigation and discourage settlement. This concern
is misplaced. The law favors fair and just settlements, not unfair or
unjust settlements brought about by a party's economic desperation or
financial inability to litigate meritorious claims. Both the public and the
justice system benefit when litigants with legitimate disputes face one
another on a level playing field. Litigation funding may even promote
settlement and discourage prolonged litigation by forcing a recalcitrant
defendant to approach a case reasonably and pragmatically in light of
the fact that its adversary has the resources to meaningfully prosecute
the matter.78
Even if litigation funding agreements like those in Rancman are
champertous, it does not necessarily follow that they have ethical
implications for the attorneys whose clients enter into them. The fact
that a client enters into a champertous agreement does not mean that
the attorney has engaged in conduct "prejudicial to the administration

78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 985-96 (2003). For a look at these issues in the popular press, see
Stuart Taylor, Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 43-53
(reporting a story promoted on the magazine's cover as "Lawsuit Hell: How Fear of
Litigation is ParalyzingOur Professions").
75. See Ronald C. Minkoff & Andrew D. Patrick, Taming the Champerty Beast: A
Proposalfor Funding Class Action Plaintiffs, PROF. LAW., Spring 2004, at 1, 5 (discussing
class actions and observing that the concern that litigation funding arrangements "foment
meritless litigation is unfounded" because investors in litigation funding companies or
syndicates "are unlikely to risk substantial sums on worthless claims").
76. Anthony J. Sebok, The Continuing Struggle Over Litigation Funding: The Ohio
Supreme Court Voids A Sale ofAn Interest In a Lawsuit, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20030616.html (June 16, 2003).
77. See, e.g., City of Orange v. San Diego County Employees Ret. Ass'n, 126 Cal. Rptr.
2d 405, 412-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (observing that settlements are favored and should be
encouraged because they promote peace and good will in the community, reduce the
expense and persistency of litigation, and prevent the justice system from becoming
overloaded). See also Farmer v. Christensen, 581 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
(stating that Michigan public policy "is to encourage the settlement of lawsuits because it
benefits both the parties and the public").
78. See In re K.A.H., 967 P.2d 91, 93 (Alaska 1998) (noting that defendants who are
"aware of the economic pressure burdening unaided plaintiffs, have every economic
incentive to prolong the litigation with frivolous motions and discovery").
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of justice" in violation of Rule 8.4(d) or DR 1-102(A)(5). 79 After all, it
is the client who entered into the agreement, not the attorney. While an
attorney is a client's agent, a client is not an agent for his attorney,8 0
8
"
and a client's alleged misconduct cannot be imputed to his attorney.
and
agreements
are
void
In those states in which litigation funding
unenforceable because they are champertous, an attorney who knows
that her client has entered into such an agreement has a duty to inform
the client that the agreement is probably unenforceable.8 2 Similarly,
in states in which champerty and maintenance have been abolished, an
attorney who learns that her client is considering entering into a
litigation funding agreement must inform the client that the agreement
may well be enforceable. 3 In jurisdictions in which the law is silent
or unsettled, an attorney must inform her client of that fact and of the
possible alternative outcomes.8 4
A more interesting scenario is this: In a jurisdiction in which
litigation funding agreements with parties are void and unenforceable
as being champertous, should an attorney instruct her client to enter
into such an agreement? Because champertors are not entitled to
restitution, 5 the client would be able to keep the funds advanced by
the litigation funding company and fully recover in her lawsuit. Some
lawyers might argue this question is easily answered in the affirmative
because a plaintiff's attorney is obligated to obtain for her client the
maximum legally possible recovery. The client's windfall is a feather in
the attorney's cap, and the fact that the funding company's ignorance of
the law in the jurisdiction caused it to strike a bad bargain is the
company's problem. 6

79. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, R. 8.4(d); MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 1102(A)(5).
80. Macke Laundry Serv. Ltd. P'ship v. Jetz Serv. Co., 931 S.W.2d 166, 176 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996).
81. Id. at 176.
82. See MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 1.1 (discussing competence); id. at R.
1.4(a)(2) (compelling lawyer to reasonably consult with client about the means by which the
client's objectives are to be accomplished); MODEL CODE, supra note 16, at DR 6-101(A)
(governing lawyers' failure to act competently).
83. Interestingly, Rancman's lawyer advised her not to enter into the agreements with
the funding companies. Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *3.
84. See MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 1.1 (discussing competence); id. at R. 1.4
(discussing duty to communicate); MODEL CODE, supra note 16, at DR 6-101(A) (governing
lawyers' competence).
85. Schwartz v. Eliades, 939 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Nev. 1997).
86. The problem may be the attorney's if the funding agreement includes a choice of
law provision requiring that the agreement be interpreted under the laws of a jurisdiction
that does not recognize champerty or maintenance. Similarly, a litigation funding company

2005]

LITIGATION FUNDING

663

The answer to this question has to be "no." Although the lawyer has
no duty to protect the funding company's interests, advising a client to
enter into a contract with the intent to dishonor it is improper. Such
advice involves "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," and is
thus, prohibited. 7 Furthermore, because the advice may negatively
affect the image or perception of the legal profession, or cause disrespect
for the profession, it is prejudicial to the administration of justice.8 8 It
is clearly professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.8 9 Finally, in those
jurisdictions that adhere to the Model Code, such advice constitutes
"conduct that adversely reflects on [the attorney's] fitness to practice
law,"9 and it creates an appearance of professional impropriety.9
None of these violations are excused by a lawyer's desire to obtain the
best possible outcome for the client; in the practice of law "the ends do
not justify the means."9 2
It is apparent that litigation funding agreements, in which a litigation
financier advances funds to an attorney rather than a party, are not
champertous. Consider again the example of a funding company that
agrees to advance money to an attorney for expenses in a given case, the
attorney being obligated upon recovery to repay the amount funded plus
a fee equal to one dollar for every dollar of funding provided. In that
situation the funding company is not supporting or maintaining
litigation in exchange for a portion of the recovery because the attorney
could repay the advance from a source other than the judgment. The
funding company can further deflect allegations of champerty and
maintenance by not funding litigation until the suit has been on file for
a reasonable time, such as six months or one year; by agreeing that the
company will not attempt to control or influence the attorney's handling

might employ a forum selection clause compelling its customers to litigate any disputes
arising under their agreements in a jurisdiction with law favorable to the company. See
Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1588-89 (1996)
(suggesting the use of a forum selection clause involving New Jersey).
87. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 8.4(c); MODEL CODE, supra note 16, at DR 1102(A)(4).
88. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Richardson, 712 A.2d 525, 532 (Md. 1998)
(explaining "that conduct that impacts on the image or the perception of the courts or the
legal profession ... and that engenders disrespect for the courts and for the legal
profession may be prejudicial to the administration of justice").
89. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 8.4(d); MODEL CODE, supra note 16, at DR 1102(A)(5).
90. MODEL CODE, supra note 16, at DR 1-102(A)(6).
91. See id. Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety").
92. In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904, 914 (D.C. 2002).
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of the case; and by making the attorney agree not to pass along any
portion of the funding company's fee to his client. A funding company
that allows a reasonable time to pass before advancing funds is not
instigating litigation; a funding company that exercises no control over
an attorney's handling of a case is not an "officious intermeddler;" and
a funding company that prohibits an attorney from passing portions of
the fee along to the client has not acquired a part of the matter being
litigated.
An attorney who wishes to enter into a funding agreement is free to
do so, provided he informs his client and the client consents.9" The
attorney must obtain the client's consent before revealing the client's
confidences to a litigation funding company,94 and the attorney must
take reasonable steps to safeguard the client's confidences once revealed
to a funding company.9" This latter duty presumably can be accomplished by placing a provision in the funding agreement whereby the
funding company promises to maintain confidentiality with respect to
information obtained regarding individual cases.9"
If the client refuses to consent to the attorney's intended means of
litigation funding, or if the client refuses to authorize the attorney to
disclose to the funding company confidential information it needs to
determine whether to fund the case, the attorney must explain to the
client the effect this restriction may have on the attorney's ability or
willingness to undertake the representation.9 7 If the attorney cannot
competently represent the client absent the desired funding, or if he is
unwilling to do so, the attorney must terminate the representation.

93. See Fla. Bar, Staff Op. 24048, at 3 (July 2, 2002) (on file with the author); Bd. of
Profl Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., Advisory Ethics Op. 2001-A-744, at 2-3
(2001) (on file with the author); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. No. 02-01,
at 1 (Feb. 11, 2002) (on file with the author).
94. State Bar of Ariz., Op. No. 2001-07, at 3 (Sept. 2001) (on file with the author).
95. Cf ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398 (1995)
(discussing nonlawyers' access to a lawyer's data base).
96. See id. at 367 (suggesting that when contracting with an outside service provider
that will have access to confidential client information, "a lawyer might be well-advised to
secure from the service provider in writing, along with or apart from any written contract
for services ... a written statement of the service provider's assurance of confidentiality").
97. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 1.4(a)(2) (obligating a lawyer to "reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be
accomplished"); id. at R. 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.").
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Usury

"Usury" refers to the "exacting, taking, or receiving of a greater rate
of interest than is allowed by law for the use or loan of money.""8
Prohibitions on usury are intended to protect vulnerable borrowers from
predatory or unscrupulous lenders. 9 "When usurious interest is part
of an agreement, the usury invalidates that part of the agreement which
provides for illegal interest, and only the actual debt and legal interest
are recoverable" by the lender. °°
Most states have statutes limiting interest rates and prohibiting
usury, although the statutes are typically riddled with exceptions.1 '
In Missouri, for example, loans to corporations, general partnerships,
limited partnerships, and limited liability companies can be made at any
in
interest rate and subject to any fees to which the parties agree
10 3
writing.' 2 The same is true for business loans of $5000 or more.
The elements necessary to establish usury vary among the states.
Most states agree that (1) there must be an agreement to lend money;
(2) the borrower's obligation to repay must be absolute; and (3) the
interest charged must be greater than the law allows. 0 4 Some states
add a fourth element and require that the lender have "a corrupt intent
to take more than the legal rate [of interest] for the use of the money
loaned,"0 5 while other states deem the lender's intent to be irrelevant. ' 6 In the litigation funding context, the second element is most
important because an agreement is not usurious if the associated debt
If repayment is based upon a
is only contingently repayable.' 7
contingency, a transaction is more like an investment or a joint
undertaking than a loan. 1 8

98. Seaton v. City of Lexington, 97 S.W.3d 72, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
99. See George v. Capital S. Mortgage Inv., Inc., 961 P.2d 32, 49 (Kan. 1998) (quoting
Indian Springs State Bank v. Kelley's Auto Supply, Inc., 675 P.2d 379, 382 (Kan. Ct. App.
1984)).
100. Killion v. Bank Midwest, 886 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
101. Martin, supra note 3, at 90 (noting categories of exemptions and criticisms of the
variations in usury laws).
102. Mo. REV. STAT. § 408.035(1) (2000).
103. Id. § 408.035(2).
104. See Martin, supra note 3, at 90-91.
105. Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
106. See, e.g., Beltz v. Dings, 6 P.3d 424, 430 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) ("The trial court is
not required to find that [the defendant] intended to commit usury. The trial court must
merely find that [he] collected interest at a rate greater than what is authorized by law.").
107. Martin, supra note 3, at 91.
108. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).
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If a litigation funding company advances funds to a plaintiff on a
nonrecourse basis, its agreement to do so should generally not be
considered usurious even if, as in Rancman, the plaintiff is potentially
obligated to pay interest at a rate upwards of one hundred percent. 0 9
Because the funding company's advance is contingent upon the plaintiff's
recovery, the plaintiff's repayment obligation is not absolute, and this
key usury element is unsatisfied. The same reasoning holds true if a
litigation funding company advances funds to an attorney on a
nonrecourse basis.
Opponents of litigation funding will likely argue that the preceding
analysis is incorrect because an agreement is still usurious if the
purported contingency on which repayment rests is in fact relatively
certain to occur.10 Opponents will point out that litigation funding
companies only participate in cases in which they expect the parties they
support to prevail. In other words, funding companies' profits do not
truly depend upon contingencies; the advances in fact create an absolute
obligation to repay, and the agreements are, therefore, usurious.
To be sure, litigation funding companies hope to invest in winning
cases rather than losing cases. It is normally wrong, however, to assume
that any case will yield a certain recovery. All experienced trial lawyers
can relate stories of losing cases they thought were sure winners."
Litigation results are not as predictable as some commentators, courts,
and attorneys may think. Thus, whether a litigation funding agreement
is usurious depends, at best, on the facts of each case." 2
Additionally, when attorneys contract with litigation funding
companies, usury allegations may be off target due to variations in state
laws. For example, Missouri permits business loans of $5000 or more to
be made at any interest rate and subject to any fees to which the parties
may agree in writing, 1 ' and these terms extend to corporations,

109. See Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 218-19 (explaining that FSF advanced Rancman
$6000 in exchange for the first $16,800 she would recover if the case was resolved within
twelve months, $22,000 if resolved within eighteen months, and $27,600 if resolved within
twenty-four months, and that Interim advanced her $1000 against the next $2800 she
expected to collect).
110.

See Martin, supra note 3, at 91 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS

§ 527 cmt. a, app. (1932)).
111. My support for this statement is admittedly anecdotal, inasmuch as I am by
training and experience a trial lawyer, and I base it on my experiences and on conversations with other trial lawyers.
112. See Catalina,881 S.W.2d at 296 ("Usury, where not apparent from the face of the
instrument, is a question of fact.").
113. Mo. REV. STAT. § 408.035(2) (2000).
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partnerships, and limited liability corporations." 4 If litigation funding
companies' advances to attorneys are loans, they clearly are business
loans, and many attorneys practice in partnerships, professional
corporations, and limited liability companies. Of course if a funding
company's advances are considered investments rather than loans, usury
law finds no application at all.
Although this section has demonstrated that litigation funding
agreements are not usurious, critics of the practice may contend that a
Michigan case, Lawsuit Financial, L.L.C. v. Curry,"5 compels a
different conclusion. In Curry, Mary Curry was awarded a $27 million
judgment by a trial court in a personal injury case because defendants
admitted liability before trial. She then obtained $177,500 in "nonrecourse capital advances" from Lawsuit Financial pursuant to an
agreement that included a repayment formula. Applying that formula,
Curry was obligated to116repay Lawsuit Financial $887,500 if she
recovered in her lawsuit.
The trial court subsequently reduced Curry's judgment, which included
$20 million in punitive damages and $7 million in compensatory
damages. The court struck the punitive damage award and remitted the
compensatory damages to just over $4.78 million. Curry then settled the
lawsuit for $4.7 million. Once Curry settled, Lawsuit Financial sought
payment of the $887,500 it claimed was owed under the agreement.
Curry refused to pay, and Lawsuit Financial sued her for breach of
contract and conversion. 7
The trial court found that Lawsuit Financial's agreement with Curry
was usurious because Curry's repayment obligation greatly exceeded
Michigan's seven percent statutory interest rate on loans. Consequently,
the trial court held that Curry was obligated to repay only "the principal
Lawsuit Financial
balance of the loan, which was $177,500.""'
appealed. "'
On appeal, Lawsuit Financial argued that its advances were not loans
The
because repayment was contingent upon Curry's recovery. 20
Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that the "'hallmark of a
loan is the absolute right to repayment."""' The court explained:

114. Id. § 408.035(1).
115. 683 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
116. Id. at 234-36.
117. Id. at 236, 239.
118, Id. at 238.
119. Id. at 235.
120. See id. at 239.
121, Id. (quoting Blackwell Ford, Inc. v. Calhoun, 555 N.W.2d 856, 859 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996)).
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We believe that the transactions at issue here were loans because at
the time the advances were made, plaintiff had an absolute right to
repayment. In support of its argument that plaintiff did not have an
absolute right to repayment, plaintiff directs us to language in the
agreements that states that repayment is contingent on defendant
Curry's recovery. Despite that language in the agreements, we
conclude that the right to repayment was absolute because the parties
entered into those agreements long after the defendants in the
underlying personal injury suit admitted liability and after the jury
returned a verdict of $27 million ....'
In short, at the time the advances were made to Curry, she was
certain to recover damages in some amount. 123 Accordingly, what
Lawsuit Financial attempted to characterize as "contingent advances"
were in fact loans with an interest rate far exceeding the Michigan legal
rate.124125 Thus, the appellate court affirmed the trial court judgment for
Curry.
The holding in Lawsuit Financialmust be limited to its unusual facts.
Had defendants in Curry's personal injury case not admitted liability,
which would have created some chance of outright reversal on appeal,
the funding company's right to repayment would not have been absolute.
In that case the funding company's advances would not have been so
easily characterized as loans, and usury law would have afforded Curry
no relief. Furthermore, Lawsuit Financial advanced funds to Curry
postjudgment. If defendants could have admitted liability but continued
to litigate damages in the belief that their conduct caused Curry no
harm and Lawsuit Financial had advanced funds to Curry prejudgment,
there again would have been no absolute right to repayment, and usury
would not have been an issue. The lesson for litigation funding
companies is simple: Do not advance funds to litigants who have
already been awarded judgments in cases in which the defendants have
admitted liability.
Parties who contract with litigation funding companies are unlikely to
see their agreements scrutinized by courts unless the parties find
themselves in litigation with their financiers. On the other hand,
attorneys who finance cases through litigation funding companies are
subject to considerable scrutiny by virtue of their membership in a self-

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id.
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Courts and disciplinary authorities that
regulating profession.126
examine the conduct of attorneys who finance cases through litigation
funding companies will likely consider ethical issues other than those
linked to the doctrines of champerty, maintenance, barratry, and usury.
These include an attorney's independence, conflicts of interest, an
attorney's duty of confidentiality, fee splitting, and an attorney's efforts
to pass along litigation funding costs to clients.
III.
A.

OTHER ETHICS RULES AND ISSUES

Attorney Independence and Conflicts of Interest

A primary concern with litigation funding is the potential for litigation
funding companies to direct or regulate the professional judgment of the
attorneys with whom they deal in order to protect the companies'
investments. In so doing, the companies may impair the attorney's
Courts commonly worry "that an
representation of his client.'27
attorney's primary loyalty will, as a practical matter, rest with the
person or entity who pays him." 2 ' Scholars share this concern.'2 9
The concern that an attorney's financial relationship with a third
party may interfere with the attorney's ability to render independent
legal advice is specifically addressed in Model Rule 5.4(c), which states:
"A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays
the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the
lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services."1 3 In
the few states that still enforce versions of the Model Code, nearly
identical language appears in DR 5-107(B). 31 Rule 5.4(c) and DR 5107(B) typically surface in cases where parents hire an attorney for their
children, businesses hire an attorney for their employees, or liability
insurers hire an attorney to defend their insureds.' 32

126. See Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A
PracticalAnalysis of Lawyer Self-Regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 175 (1999)

("Law is a self-regulating profession.").
127. See Minkoff & Patrick, supra note 75, at 5 (discussing this concern in connection
with class actions).
128. Oliver v. Bd. of Governors, 779 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Ky. 1989).
129. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 60, at § 45.8 (discussing Rule 5.4(c) and
admonishing lawyers to be sure they are serving their clients and not "currying favor" with
non-clients).
130. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 5.4(c).
131. MODEL CODE, supra note 16, at DR 5-107(B) ("A lawyer shall not permit a person
who recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or
regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal services.").
132. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 60, at § 45.8 (discussing Rule 5.4(c)).
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Although an attorney might violate Rule 5.4(c) and DR 5-107(B) by
relying on a litigation funding company to perform certain tasks, which
the attorney should perform himself, such as: (1) conducting the factual
or legal analysis on which a client's lawsuit might be premised; (2)
providing legal advice to the client; (3) drafting pleadings; or (4)
initiating the action being funded, the rules by their terms do not appear
to apply to typical litigation funding agreements. 133 A litigation
funding company that advances funds for case expenses is simply not
employing or paying the attorney to render legal services for the
attorney's client. It cannot be said that the funding company is
employing the attorney when the funding company cannot terminate the
attorney's representation of the client. The company certainly is not
paying the attorney; it is advancing funds that the attorney has agreed
to repay. Furthermore, attorneys can avoid violating Rule 5.4(c) and DR
5-107(B) by insisting that litigation funding companies with which they
do business include a clause in their agreements promising that the
company will not attempt to direct or regulate the attorney's professional
judgment in the funded cases.
Even if an attorney's agreement with a litigation funding company
does not run afoul of Rule 5.4(c) or DR 5-107(B), the attorney must still
be careful not to violate conflict of interest rules. Under the version of
Model Rule 1.7(b) employed in most states,3 an attorney "shall not
represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities ... to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests," unless the attorney "reasonably believes" that
the client's representation "will not be adversely affected," and "the
client consents after consultation."1 35 In the few jurisdictions still
adhering to the Model Code, an attorney must adhere to DR 5-101(A),13 ' which provides: "Except with the consent of his client after full
disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his

133. See In re Thrasher, 661 N.E.2d 546, 548 (Ind.1996) (holding that a lawyer violated
Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 5.4(c) by allowing an accountant, who referred
bankruptcy matters to him, "to conduct the factual and legal analysis underlying the
client's bankruptcy, to provide legal advice to the client and to draft the pleading initiating
the action in which the [lawyer] eventually appeared as counsel of record").
134. Model Rule 1.7 was dramatically modified in 2002 as a result of the work of the
American Bar Association's Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, better known as the Ethics 2000 Commission. See ABA, CTR. FOR PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, THE 2002 CHANGES TO THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 22-30

(2003).
135. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2001) [hereinafter 2001 MODEL
RULES].

136.

MODEL CODE, supra note 16, at DR 5-101(A).
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professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may
be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal
interests."'3 7 These rules recognize that an attorney must be able to
represent a client "untrammeled by a conflicting loyalty to another"'38
and unimpeded by the attorney's own interests. 39 An attorney can
violate Rule 1.7(b) or DR 5-101(A) as a result of the conflict of interest
even if the client suffers no actual injury. 4 °
Clients can waive conflicts of interest under Model Rule 1.7(b) and DR
5-101(A).' 4 ' A client's consent to an attorney's representation in the
face of a possible conflict of interest, however, must be "informed conThis means that valid consent can come only after the
sent." 4 2
attorney consults with the client about the conflict. 143 To satisfy the
consultation requirement, the attorney must communicate information
to the client "reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the
Put another way, the
significance of the matter in question."'
attorney must convey to the client "reasonably adequate information
about the material risks" of the representation. 4 '
The conflict of interest most likely to arise involves the disclosure of
client confidences.' 46 More particularly, a litigation funding company
with which an attorney is dealing may require information necessary for
it to decide whether to fund the case. While the attorney may want to
reveal the information in order to obtain the funding, the client may
consider the information to be confidential. Fortunately, this conflict is
easily waived, so long as the attorney takes reasonable steps to

137. Id.
138. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Andre, 957 P.2d 545, 547-48 (Okla. 1998)
(discussing Rule 1.7(b)).
139. In re Discipline of Mattson, 651 N.W.2d 278, 287 (S.D. 2002) (citing the comment
to Rule 1.7(b) for the proposition that "[a] lawyer's own interests should not be permitted
to have an adverse effect on [the] representation of [a] client").
140. People v. Cozier, 74 P.3d 531, 536 (Colo. 2003) (discussing Rule 1.7(b)); Iowa
Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Wagner, 599 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Iowa 1999)
(discussing DR 5-101(A)).
141. See 2001 MODEL RULES, supra note 135, at R. 1.7(b)(2) (providing for client
consent 'after consultation"); MODEL CODE, supra note 16, at DR 5-101(A) (allowing for
client consent "after full disclosure").
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 (2000) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
143. 2001 MODEL RULES, supra note 135, at R. 1.7(b)(2).
144. Id. Terminology.
145. RESTATEMENT, supra note 142, at § 122(1).
146. See Commonwealth v. Downey, 793 N.E.2d 377, 381-82 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)
(explaining that a lawyer's agreement with a third-party to reveal confidential client
information without the client's consent creates a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(b)).
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safeguard
the client's confidences once revealed to the funding compa47
ny.1
Critics of litigation funding who see it as a settlement disincentive
may argue that an attorney's decision to finance case expenses through
a litigation funding company will create a conflict of interest between
the attorney and the client when (1) the attorney agrees with the
funding company not to pass on any portion of its fees to the client, and
(2) the client instructs the attorney to accept a settlement offer so low
that the attorney will receive little or nothing for his services because of
his obligation to repay the funding company. Although contrary to the
client's wishes, the attorney's self-interest may cause him to argue
against settlement on those terms. Even if this speculative scenario does
occur, however, it is no basis to decry litigation funding.
Assume that an attorney enters into a contingent fee agreement with
a client. The agreement provides that expenses advanced by the
attorney are to be paid first out of any recovery received. As the case
progresses, the attorney advances $50,000 in expenses. Ultimately, the
plaintiff becomes so exhausted by the litigation that she is unwilling to
continue, even if it means foregoing any recovery, and she directs the
attorney to settle for $50,000. The attorney does not want to settle for
this amount because he will not receive a fee. The case expenses have
created a settlement disincentive, the same as if a litigation funding
company had advanced them.
Because the decision to settle is solely the client's,148 settlement
disincentives are imbedded in any contingent fee representation.'4 9
Attorneys who are concerned that their interests may materially limit
a client's representation should obtain the client's consent to the
representation. 50
Despite the many settlement-related conflicts
present in contingent fee representations, no jurisdiction broadly forbids

147.

See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.

148. RESTATEMENT, supra note 142, at § 22(1) (stating that "whether and on what
terms to settle a claim" is a decision reserved to the client except when the client validly
authorizes the lawyer to make that decision); MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 1.2(a) ("A
lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter.").
149. See, e.g., Kay v. Home Depot, Inc., 623 So. 2d 764, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(involving client who refused to accept lawyer's recommendations that she settle case).
Lawyers are prohibited from drafting contingent fee agreements under which clients
surrender the right to control settlement. See, e.g., In re Grievance Proceeding, 171 F.
Supp. 2d 81, 82-85 (D. Conn. 2001) (finding Rule 1.2(a) violation but declining to impose
discipline because lawyer did not attempt to enforce term in agreement and deleted it from
subsequent agreements); In re Lansky, 678 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind. 1997) (involving
Indiana version of Rule 1.2(a)).
150. See In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904, 913 (D.C. 2002) (discussing Rule 1.7 and attorney
fees in a class action settlement).

2005]

LITIGATION FUNDING

673

contingent fee agreements in the same way that some courts and
commentators seem willing to forbid litigation funding agreements.''
It may be that a client and an attorney cannot agree on settlement, to
the point that the attorney feels compelled to withdraw from the
representation." 2 There also may be cases in which a client fires his
attorney because of a disagreement over settlement issues, which is the
client's right. 153 Because these conflicts are true in many cases,
however, it cannot reasonably be said that litigation funding agreements
create new or special conflicts in the settlement context.
Finally, concerning conflicts of interest, it is important to note that
Model Rule 1.7 was significantly amended in 2002.'5" Under the latest
version of Model Rule 1.7(a), "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest."'55' A concurrent conflict of interest exists if "there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer." 5 ' Nonetheless, under
new Model Rule 1.7(b), an attorney may represent a client even when
there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially
limited by the attorney's responsibilities to others or by his personal
interest if certain conditions are present: (1) the attorney "reasonably
believes" that he will be able to "provide competent and diligent
representation to the client";.57 (2) the representation is not "prohibited
by law"; 58 (3) "the representation does not involve the assertion of a
claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in

151. Lawyers are forbidden from charging contingent fees in criminal cases. MODEL
RULES, supra note 15, at R. 1.5(d)(2); MODEL CODE, supra note 16, at DR 2-106(C). In
some jurisdictions lawyers may be prohibited from charging contingent fees in domestic
relations cases. See MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 1.5(d)(1).
152. See, e.g., Kay, 623 So. 2d at 765 (involving a lawyer who withdrew from
representation after the client declined to settle, against the lawyer's recommendation).
153. See In re Lansky, 678 N.E.2d at 1116 ("A client has the right to discharge a lawyer
at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment of the lawyer's
services."); In re Jones, 859 So. 2d 666, 670 (La. 2003) ("It is well-settled that a client has
an absolute right to discharge his or her lawyer at any time."); Rose v. Welch, 115 S.W.3d
478, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (observing that "a client has the right to discharge his or
her attorney with or without cause").
154. ABA, CTR.FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, THE 2002 CHANGES TO THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 22-30 (2003).

155.
156.
157.
158.

MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 1.7(a).
Id. at R. 1.7(a)(2).
Id. at R. 1.7(b)(1).
Id. at R. 1.7(b)(2).
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the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal";'59 and6 0(4)
"each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing."
Nothing in the new rule appears to affect conflict of interest analysis
in the litigation funding context. The fact that the new rule requires
written consent where the old rule did not is practically meaningless.
Prudent attorneys have always insisted upon written consent to guard
against later disqualification attempts or malpractice allegations. The
pivotal condition is, as it always has been, the first one: the attorney
must reasonably believe that he can competently and diligently
represent the client despite any divergent interests. For an attorney's
belief to be reasonable, he must actually believe the proposition at issue,
and it must be the case "that a 'reasonably prudent and competent
lawyer' would come to the same belief, given the same information and
If the attorney's belief is unreasonable, client
time for reflection."' 6
consent to the representation is irrelevant.'6 2
B.

Confidentiality

Litigation funding raises concerns about client confidentiality,
regardless of whether the funding is sought by the client or by the
attorney. For instance, a litigation funding company may require a
client who applies for funding to have his attorney provide the company
with otherwise confidential information that will allow the company to
decide whether it should fund the case.'63 Assuming the client instructs the attorney to provide the desired information, the attorney
must then weigh associated confidentiality and privilege concerns and
decide how to respond.
The Philadelphia Bar Association's Professional Guidance Committee
(the "Philadelphia Committee") considered this issue in 2000 when it
was asked whether it was permissible under the Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional Conduct 16 4 "for an attorney to provide substantive information about a personal injury client's claim to a third-party lender
which is considering providing funds to the client during the pendency

159. Id. at R. 1.7(b)(3).
160. Id. at R. 1.7(b)(4).
161. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 60, § 11.20, at 11-60.
162. See id. ("Thus, a lawyer who plunges ahead with the representation, oblivious to
risks that his performance will be compromised by conflicting loyalties, will ordinarily have
violated Rule 1.7, even if the affected clients gave consent.").
163. Lawyers' duty to maintain clients' confidences "is far broader than the protection
provided by the attorney-client privilege." HAZARD & HODES, supranote 66, § 9.11, at 9-43.
164. PENNSYLVANLA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1998).
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of the personal injury case" on a nonrecourse basis. 165 The Philadelphia Committee determined that the requesting attorney could provide
the information to the funding company, "assuming full disclosure [was
made] to the client of the advantages and disadvantages of (the]
transaction to the client," especially including "the risk of waiver of the
attorney-client privilege (and the potential ramifications thereof)." 66
The Philadelphia Committee warily observed:
The importance of consultation with the client about the possible risk
of loss of not only client confidentiality but also of the attorney-client
privilege as a result of supplying [case] assessment-type information to
the potential lender cannot be underestimated. The [attorney] is welladvised to document carefully the client's assent to the disclosure and,
even then, to make it clear to the lender that the disclosures will be
restricted as much as possible-perhaps even limited to only that
which would be discoverable without intrusion upon the
information
167
privilege.
In 2003 the Philadelphia Committee was asked to examine "a proposed
agreement between an attorney and a Funding Company whereby the
Funding Company would advance loans to the attorney to cover
litigation costs." 68 The agreement passed ethical muster, although the
opinion was silent about the agreement's terms. 6 9 Because one
provision in the agreement apparently required the attorney to provide
certain documentation about the case to the funding company, the
Philadelphia Committee conditioned its approval upon the modification
of the agreement to provide for the client's specific consent 70to the
attorney supplying the documentation to the funding company.
The Philadelphia Committee's opinions highlight the importance of
confidentiality considerations in litigation funding. The gravity of these
considerations depends on the facts of the particular case. In any event,
it is far from certain that an attorney's disclosure of client confidences
to a litigation funding company will waive the attorney-client privilege.
Logic and fairness dictate that such disclosures retain their privileged
status by virtue of the client's and the funding company's common

165. Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Profl Guidance Comm., Op. No. 99-8, at 1 (Feb. 2000)
[hereinafter Philadelphia Bar Op. No. 99-8] (on file with the author).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Profl Guidance Comm., Op. No. 2003-15, at 1 (Oct. 2003)
(on file with the author).
169. See id. at 1-2.
170. Id. at 2.
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interest in the litigation. 17 1 What is certain is that the attorney must
explain to the client the risk that disclosure to the
litigation funding
172
company may waive the attorney-client privilege.
C.

Fee Splitting

As a general rule, attorneys may not share fees with laypersons, a
practice sometimes called "fee splitting."1 73 Rules against fee splitting
are intended to protect clients by increasing the likelihood that they will
receive competent representation. 174
Unfortunately, Model Rule
5.4(a)175 and DR 3-102(A), 176 which prohibit fee splitting except in
certain narrow exceptions, "sweep much too broadly by banning
innovative forms of practice even ...
where the risk that [the] client
will be exposed to professional incompetence is negligible." 77
There may be some concern that litigation funding agreements, in
which funding companies advance funds to attorneys for case expenses,
constitute fee splitting. Any such concern is unfounded. First, a typical
litigation funding agreement does not require the attorney to repay the
funding company out of the attorney's contingent fee. Because the
attorney can repay the funding company from 7any source of funds, the
attorney is not sharing fees with a layperson.1 1
Second, in typical litigation funding agreements, the amount the
attorney is required to pay the funding company is unrelated to the
amount of the attorney's fee. In our hypothetical case of an agreement
that obligates an attorney to pay upon recovery the amount funded plus
a fee equal to one dollar for every dollar of funding provided, the amount

171. See generallyEDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATtORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORKPRODUCT DOCTRINE 196 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing the "common interest privilege," which
is in fact "an exception to the general rule that the attorney-client privilege is waived when
privileged information is disclosed to a third party").
172. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 769, at 3 (Nov. 4, 2003) ("The
lawyer should advise the client that disclosures of confidential information to the financing
institution might compromise the attorney-client privilege ... and might therefore cause
the information to be available to an adverse party in discovery.") (citation omitted) (on file
with the author); Philadelphia Bar Op. No. 99-8, supra note 168, at 1.
173. See MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 5.4(a) (stating that "[a] lawyer or law firm
shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer," subject to certain exceptions); MODEL CODE,
supra note 16, DR 3-102(A) (same).
174. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 60, at § 45.6.
175. See MODEL RULES, supra note 15, R. 5.4(a).
176. See MODEL CODE, supra note 16, at DR 3-102(A).
177. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 60, at § 45.6 (footnote omitted).
178. See Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar, 709 A.2d 112, 122 (Md.
1998) (indicating that impermissible fee splitting occurs only where a lawyer "share[s] part
of his or her own fee with a non-lawyer").
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to be paid to the funding company is in no way measured by the
attorney's fee. Indeed, the attorney might be obligated to pay the
funding company an amount greater than her fee, and might further be
required to pay the funding company in a case in which she receives no
fee.
Third, if litigation funding constitutes fee splitting, then an attorney
also engages in fee splitting when he borrows from a bank to finance
litigation. Of course there is no prohibition against attorneys borrowing
from banks to finance their practices. No courts or disciplinary
authorities have ever suggested that attorneys who finance aspects of
their practices with bank loans "share" or "split" their fees with the
banks when they make loan payments. Likewise, rules against fee
splitting should not bar attorneys from entering into litigation funding
agreements, inasmuch as litigation funding companies are nothing more
than specialized lenders or investors.
Fourth, to the extent there are concerns that fee splitting encourages
non-lawyers to influence attorneys' professional judgments in the
interest of protecting their investments,'79 a reasonable argument can
be made that a bank officer may behave similarly if an attorney who
borrows from a bank falls behind on her loan payments. Again, no
courts or disciplinary authorities have ever banned attorneys from
borrowing from traditional lenders to finance their practices. Beyond
that, the threat of undue influence purportedly linked to fee splitting
should be addressed on a case-by-case basis; it is not a sufficient reason
to broadly prohibit litigation funding.
Finally, if prohibitions against fee splitting are intended to protect
clients against the risk of incompetent representation attributable to
factors other than non-lawyers' influence, they generally have no
application to litigation funding. Litigation funding companies do not
knowingly advance funds to incompetent attorneys because incompetent
attorneys are unlikely to obtain favorable settlements or judgments in
their cases, and thus diminish a funding company's chance of a return
on its investment. There is no evidence that attorneys who enter into
litigation funding agreements represent their clients less effectively as
a result.

179. Bans on fee splitting are intended in part to address the concern that "[a] person
entitled to share a lawyer's fees is likely to attempt to influence the lawyer's activities so
as to maximize those fees. That could lead to inadequate legal services." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 142, at § 10 cmt. b.
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PassingAlong Litigation Funding Costs to the Client

When an attorney finances case expenses through a litigation funding
company and is obligated to repay the funds advanced plus a fee, the
attorney faces two basic choices: (1) pay the funding company from his
own funds or (2) have the client pay the funding company. Clients are
routinely obligated in contingent fee agreements to repay their attorneys
for the expenses the attorneys advance. Ethics rules expressly permit
this practice. 80 But litigation funding presents a new issue in the
ability of attorneys to require clients to pay the fees charged by funding
companies.
Returning yet again to our example of a litigation funding company
that advances $50,000 to a successful plaintiff's attorney and charges a
fee equal to one dollar for every dollar of funding provided, can the
attorney require the client to pay the $50,000 in expenses plus the
$50,000 fee? To answer this question it is necessary to look at the
analogous situation of an attorney assessing a client for interest charges
incurred by the attorney on a loan obtained to finance the client's case.
Chittenden v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.",' is a
representative case.
In Chittenden, plaintiff George Chittenden retained attorney Darryl
Carimi to represent him in connection with a personal injury claim
stemming from an automobile accident. Chittenden signed a retainer
agreement that authorized Carimi to obtain a loan at his discretion "to
'[pay] the costs and expenses necessary to prosecute"' Chittenden's
claim. 8 2 Although the agreement did not provide for a specific
interest rate, Chittenden also agreed "'that the full amount of the
interest charged on such loans will be reimbursed to [a]ttorneys ... out
Over the course of the
of the funds received on [his] claim."""
expenses
on Chittenden's
a
number
of
Carimi
advanced
representation,
behalf.8 4 At the end of each month, Carimi drew on his line of credit
at a bank to pay the funds advanced. He then assessed an interest
charge to Chittenden's account through his firm." 5

180. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 1.8(e)(1) (stating that a lawyer "may advance
court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the
outcome of the matter").
181. 788 So. 2d 1140 (La. 2001).
182. Id. at 1143 (quoting retainer agreement).
183. Id. (quoting retainer agreement).
184. Id. (including medical expenses, court costs, postage, photocopy charges, and
Chittenden's living expenses).
185. Id.
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Chittenden fired Carimi and hired new counsel, who settled his claim
for $1.35 million. Carimi then intervened in Chittenden's case to protect
his right to recover the fees he claimed were owed. Carimi also sought
to recover the expenses he advanced and the interest on the funds drawn
from his line of credit. Chittenden agreed to pay Carimi $46,162.54,
reflecting the expenses advanced, but he refused to pay the $40,000 in
interest that Carimi sought. The trial court held that Carimi was
agreed. Chittenden
entitled to the interest and a lower appellate court
186
then appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Chittenden argued that the interest charges on the funds advanced by
Carimi violated Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct ("RPC")
1.8(e),"8 7 addressing an attorney's ability to advance court costs and
expenses, and potentially violated RPC 1.4,18, governing client communications.' 8 9 Chittenden further argued that the interest charges were
impermissible because his retainer agreement with Carimi did not
specify an interest rate. 190 The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected
Chittenden's arguments.' 9'
Louisiana case law and RPC 1.8(e) expressly permit attorneys to
advance court costs and expenses.' 9 2 It was "eminently clear" that the
retainer agreement authorized Carimi to secure a loan to pay Chittenden's case expenses, and that Chittenden had thus authorized Carimi to
draw against Carimi's line of credit to finance the case. Moreover, and
in accordance with RPC 1.4, the retainer agreement fully informed
Chittenden that Carimi would be borrowing money to finance the
93

case. 1

With respect to the interest, the retainer agreement "clearly provided"
that Chittenden would fully reimburse Carimi for interest out of any
recovery.9 4 "Thus, once again, the contract between the parties
articulated both the expectation that interest would be charged on the
would ultimately be
loans [that] Carimi made and that Chittenden
195
responsible for the payment of that interest."

Regarding the interest rate, it appeared that Carimi charged
Chittenden a rate of twelve percent, which was the interest rate at

186.
187.

Id.
LouIsIANA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 1.8(e) (1992).

188. Id. at § 1.4.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Chittenden, 788 So. 2d at 1146 & nn. 13, 14.
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1144.
See id. at 1145-46.
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1149.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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which Carimi borrowed from his bank. This rate was reasonable,
especially considering that Chittenden had previously paid twenty
percent interest on a loan arranged by another attorney and had once
paid twenty-four to thirty-eight percent on a loan from a finance
company.'96 Furthermore, there was no evidence of any "hidden,
improper motive" on Carimi's part in charging interest on loans that he
himself had to repay.'9 ' Carimi's only error was that because he did
not specify in the retainer agreement that the interest would be
compounded, Chittenden was only obligated to pay simple interest.19 s
The court's rationale in Chittenden would seem to apply equally when
an attorney, rather than charging interest on funds that he borrows to
pay case expenses, passes along to the client the fees charged by a
litigation funding company. So long as the attorney fully informs the
client of his intent to charge the fees to the client before entering into an
agreement with the funding company, and the client consents to the
practice, there is no apparent prohibition. Fees charged by a litigation
funding company to an attorney are analogous to the interest charged
to Carimi by his bank, and Model Rule 1.8(e)(1) allows an attorney to
"advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which
may be contingent on the outcome of the matter."99
The problem facing an attorney who wishes to pass along fees charged
by a funding company to clients, and a potential problem that the court
in Chittenden acknowledged in passing, is the reasonableness of those
fees.2 °° The court in Chittenden approved of Carimi charging twelve
percent simple interest, especially because Chittenden had previously
borrowed funds at a rate of interest as high as thirty-eight percent.'0 '
In contrast, a litigation funding company that charges an attorney a fee
equal to one dollar for every dollar advanced is charging the equivalent
of one hundred percent interest. Therefore, an attorney who passes
along such fees to his client is charging his client the equivalent of one
hundred percent interest. At some point it would seem that usury would
have to concern the attorney, depending on whether a funding company's
advances are loans as compared to investments and on the law of the
particular jurisdiction.
196. Id. at 1143 n.3, 1149.
197. Id. at 1149.
198. Id. at 1151.
199. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, at R. 1.8(e)(1).
200. See Chittenden, 788 So. 2d at 1149 (discussing reasonableness of interest charged
by Carimi in light of Chittenden's borrowing history).

201. Id. (Chittenden had paid twenty percent interest on a loan arranged by a previous
attorney, and twenty-four to thirty-eight percent interest on a loan from a finance

company).
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Attorneys clearly minimize their professional responsibility risk by not
passing the fees charged to them by litigation funding companies to their
clients. To avoid allegations of usury, an attorney who desires to pass
along the fees charged by a litigation funding company could pass along
only part of those fees. Using the example of a funding company that
charges a fee of one dollar for every dollar advanced, an attorney who is
obligated to pay the funding company a fee of $50,000 might pass along
only $10,000 of that fee to the client. The $10,000 charge would be
equivalent to twenty percent interest, or roughly the rate of interest
charged by some credit card companies. Alternatively, the attorney
might pass along to the client a percentage of the litigation funding
company's fee that corresponds to the state's statutorily permissible
interest rate.
As a practical matter, attorneys often will be unable to charge their
litigation funding fees to their clients. Funding agreements commonly
include provisions that prohibit the attorneys from passing along to their
clients any portion of the funding company's fees.20 2 Attorneys are
ethically bound to honor their contracts. °3
IV.

CONCLUSION

Litigation is expensive, and plaintiffs may need financial assistance
between the event giving rise to the litigation and eventual recovery by
way of settlement or judgment. Litigation funding companies will
advance money to plaintiffs for living expenses when traditional lenders
are unwilling to do so because of the uncertainties inherent in litigation.
Funding companies are willing to advance expenses to attorneys when
traditional lenders will not, or when traditional lenders will do so only
on terms that attorneys consider unacceptable. Litigation funding is, in
fact, an important financial services industry.
Unfortunately, litigation funding has been met by judicial hostility.
This hostility has been fueled by courts' concerns about champerty,
maintenance, and usury. Attorneys whose clients obtain litigation
funding must be concerned about related ethics issues, and they must
also give careful thought to their professional responsibilities when they
themselves enter into agreements with funding companies to finance

202. See, e.g., Fla. Bar, Staff Op. 24048, at 2 (July 2, 2002) (listing terms of litigation
funding agreement being reviewed); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Profl Guidance Comm., Op.
2003-15, at 1 (Oct. 2003) (discussing terms of funding agreement); Bd. of Profl Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., Advisory Ethics Op. 2001-A-744, at 1 (2001) (identifying
terms in funding agreement).
203. See In re Warner, 11 P.3d 1160, 1162 (Kan. 2000) (finding ethics violation where
lawyer breached agreement to reimburse witness for travel expenses).
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case expenses. Despite these concerns, litigation funding poses few
serious ethical problems for attorneys. The ethical issues most likely to
surface-those related to confidentiality, interference with professional
judgment, conflicts of interest, and client communication-are common
Although these issues always merit attorneys' careful
concerns.
attention, they are not unique to litigation funding nor are they
especially troubling in this context.
Attorneys who hope to minimize the professional responsibility risks
associated with litigation funding would be wise to insist on certain
provisions in the funding agreements into which they or their clients
enter. First, the funding company should agree that it will neither
attempt to direct nor regulate the attorney's judgment in the case being
funded. Second, the agreement should provide that the funding
company will take all reasonable steps to safeguard the confidentiality
of information provided to it by the attorney or the client. Attorneys
should decline to do business with litigation funding companies that are
unwilling to agree to these conditions, and they should similarly steer
their clients away from such companies.
If attorneys finance case expenses through a litigation funding
company with the intent to pass along the expenses and any associated
fees to their clients, the attorneys must be careful to provide for those
fees in their agreements with their clients. They must also carefully
scrutinize the amount of any funding fees passed through to the client,
given that those fees may be found to be usurious. Attorneys minimize
their professional responsibility risk by agreeing not to pass along
funding companies' fees to their clients. If a funding agreement
prohibits an attorney from passing along to the client any portion of the
funding company fees, the attorney must honor the contract.

